We investigate whether and how technical cooperation aid (TC) facilitates technological diffusion from developed to developing countries, comparing it with foreign direct investment (FDI) and external openness. Two robust findings emerge. First, TC, FDI and openness all contribute to international technology transfers and openness seems to contribute the most which is followed by TC. Second, around six to 17 countries out of 85 in our sample fail to catch up to the technological leader over the 36 years. These results suggest that as a policy instrument, TC can play an important role in facilitating technological catch up of developing countries.
Introduction
Recently, there is an emerging dispute over the effectiveness of foreign aid in facilitating economic growth (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Easterly et al. 2004; Dalgaard, et al. 2005; Roodman, 2007; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008) . Burnside and Dollar (2000) , one of the most influential papers in this issue, found that the impact of aid on the growth of recipients is positive, conditional on good policies. However, other studies cast doubts on this conditional linkage between aid and growth (Easterly et al. 2004; Easterly 2003; Roodman, 2007; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008) . These studies treat aid as homogeneous official capital flows from developed to developing countries.
Yet, three types of foreign aid flow exist: loans, grants, and technical cooperation aid (hereafter, TC). By the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD, loans, grants, and TC are defined, respectively, as "transfers for which repayment is required,"
"transfers made in cash, goods, or services for which no repayment is required," and "activities whose primary purpose is to augment the level of knowledge, skills, and technical know-how or productive aptitudes of the population of developing countries." Figure 1 shows the trend of these three aid components.
While there are recent policy and academic debates over the relative effectiveness of loans and grants (Meltzer 2000; Bulow and Rogoff 2005; Iimi and Ojima 2008; Cordella and Ulku 2004; and Gupta et al. 2003) , there are only a few existing studies which explicitly analyze heterogeneities in types of aid. Particularly, the effectiveness of technical cooperation aid has been largely unexplored. For example, Burnside and Dollar (2000) employed the aid variable compiled by Chang et al. (1998) that is a sum of loans and grants, excluding TC because, in their view, the 3 donor, rather than the recipient, benefits from payments received in return for the technical assistance supplied. Moreover, Cassen et al. (1994) pointed out the absence of ready methodology for measuring the effectiveness of aggregate long-run effects of TC and difficulties in measuring the impacts have hindered academia from conducting quantitative evaluations of TC.
Apparently, however, TC shares a non-negligible portion of the total ODA and the amount is increasing (Figure 1 ). Conceptually, it may be obvious that, by nature, there are positive spillover effects of international technology transfers through TC, as some international aid agencies state explicitly (JICA 2007; GTZ 2007 ). TC's range of coverage is wide: training staff to deliver technological skills in the areas of agriculture, forestry, engineering, and ICT; to convey management skills in the areas of education, and business and banking; to design effective policies in the areas of social security, housing, health, and family planning. 1 TC in a wide variety of sectors has also played an important role in increasing the stock of human intellectual capital, or the capacity for more effective use of existing factor endowment. However, to our knowledge, its effectiveness has not yet been quantitatively measured. This paper aims to bridge this gap in the literature by analyzing the role of TC in facilitating technology transfers from donors to aid recipients. We employ TFP data, which is a broad measure of a country's aggregate productivity, and evaluate overall impact of TC on closing the TFP gap between the technological leader and developing countries.
In growth theories, technological progress has been regarded as a core element in long-run growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004; Aghion and Howitt 1998) . The source of such technological progress in developing countries is multi-faceted. In addition to TC, we also examine the other three possibly important determinants of international technological transfers from developed to developing countries. First, for developing countries as latecomers, the adoption, imitation, and assimilation of the flows of technical know-how from developed countries, rather than the development of domestic R&D sectors, augment their productivity to catch-up to the technological leader. 2 This also suggests the importance of absorptive capacity of advanced foreign technologies in developing countries (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1973; Abramovitz, 1986; Glass and Saggi 1998; Lucas 1993; Eaton and Kortum 1996; Keller 2004) . The absorptive capacity, with which the gap between the technology frontier and the current level of productivity is filled, should closely depend on the level of human capital (Nelson and Phelps 1966; Keller 2004; Benhabib and Spiegel 2005) .
Second, foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) has long been considered an important channel for technological diffusion (Keller 2004) . Existing case studies and cross-country regression results found that FDI contributes relatively more to economic growth than do domestic investments (Balasubramanyam et al. 1996; Borensztein et al. 1998; de Mello 1999; Eaton and Kortum 1999; van Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) and Ohkawa and Kohama (1989) suggest that Japan is a typical example of borrowed technology-driven industrialization. They argue that Japan's success was attributable to its rapid human capital accumulation by which absorptive capacity of foreign technology has been built. 3 Yet de Mello (1999) shows that FDI positively and significantly affects TFP for OECD countries, while it does not result in significant consequence for non-OECD countries. Also, Carkovic and Levine (2005) imply the consequences of FDI's positive impact on economic growth are possibly due to endogeneity bias.
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( Borensztein et al. 1998 ). This finding suggests that FDI may be an important route of international technological spillover (Keller 2004 ).
Finally, international trade has been identified as an important means of transferring foreign technology (Keller 2004 ).
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Knowledge spillovers will increase with the number of commercial interactions between domestic and foreign agents (Grossman and Helpman 1991) . We also need to distinguish between imports and exports. Imports have been regarded as a significant channel of technology diffusion because, obviously, technologies move from an exporting country of intermediate inputs to another (Keller 2004 ). Coe and Helpman (1995) find that foreign R&D capital stocks have stronger effects on domestic productivity the larger the share of domestic imports in GDP.
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Also, exports may be important because firms can learn foreign technologies through exporting experiences (Keller 2004 ). While in existing empirical studies we do not necessarily have firm evidence of technology diffusion through importing and learning-by-exporting effects (Keller 2004) , it would be reasonable to hypothesize that the extent of international technology transfers will increase with the volume of international trade.
In this paper, we compare the relative importance of different channels in facilitating international technology transfers quantitatively. Our strategy is to extend a standard model of international technology transfer of Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) by incorporating TC, FDI, and external openness, and to explore the role of TC as a 4 In the initial phases of development, much of the R&D undertaken in Japan was absorptive, aimed at integrating foreign technologies (Blumenthal 1976 ). More recently, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, India, and China view FDI by firms from technologically advanced countries as a vehicle of technology transfer (Glass and Saggi 1998) . 5 Their estimates also suggest that the foreign R&D capital stock may be at least as important as the domestic R&D capital stock in the smaller countries, while in the larger countries (the G7) the domestic R&D capital stock may be more important.
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channel of technological diffusion through comparisons of FDI and openness.
To preview the results, two sets of robust empirical findings emerge. First, TC, FDI, and openness all contribute to facilitating international technology transfers.
Yet, among these three channels, openness seems to contribute the most, followed by TC. Also, TC seems to compensate for the lack of sufficient human capital in developing countries. Second, around six to 17 countries out of 85 in our sample fail to catch up to the technological leader over the 36 years. These results suggest that as a policy instrument, TC can play an important role in the facilitating technological catch-up of developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show our theory of international technological transfers which is an augmented version of the exponential and logistic specifications of a Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) model of international technology transfers. Section 3 describes the data and econometric framework as well as the nested functional forms of specification incorporating the exponential and logistic technology diffusion. In Section 4, we present estimation results of model parameters and the computed required amount of TC for each country that is needed for catching up to the technological leader. Section 5 describes various robustness tests, which is followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
A Theoretical Framework of International Technology Transfers
There must be a certain market structure under which rational agents engage in innovation in the face of international technological diffusion (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997; and Benhabib and Spiegel 2005) . We intend to employ a tractable empirical 7 model to uncover a wide variety of important dimensions of technology transfers. The pattern of international technological diffusion can be exponential, which would predict that developing nations exhibit positive catch-up with the leader nation (Nelson and Phelps 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel 2005) . In this case, the model of technology diffusion can be formalized by the following equation:
where the variables αΦ and βΦ represent respectively the follower country's capacity to innovate own technology and to absorb foreign technologies.
On the other hand, if international technological diffusion follows a logistic pattern, the gap between the technology leader and a follower may widen over time. 
where the new part, A i0 /A m0 , indicates the difficulty of adopting distant technologies.
In this paper, we employ the Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) 
where A i0 is the level of total factor productivity (TFP) for country i at year t where country m is the technological leader, e.g., the US, and i is a follower country. The variable Φ represents the follower country's capacity to innovate own technology and to absorb foreign technologies. We assume that Φ is a function of the initial or long-term average level of human capital, h, the amount of TC received, TC, the flow of FDI, FDI, and the degree of external trade openness, OPEN. According to Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) , the values of parameters, c, g, and s will determine whether a country will converge to the growth rate of the leader or whether the growth rates will diverge.
Note that the specification represented in Equation (1) nests the logistic model when s = 1 and exponential model when s = −1.
In the case where
, as is shown by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) , the technological catch-up condition for the technological progress rate of a country to converge to the technological growth rate of the leader becomes:
Note that this is a necessary condition for the catch-up. Hence, if the inequality did not hold and reversed, the country would not technologically catch-up to the leader.
This situation may be called a technological poverty trap. 
An Econometric Model and Data

An Econometric Model
In order to empirically implement the estimation of equation (3) To be consistent with the theoretical framework, we should exclude the constant term, b 0 . Yet from the viewpoint of econometric analysis, an inclusion of a constant term is not necessarily an implausible idea. In fact, even from the theoretical viewpoint, Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) pointed that the constant term could be interpreted as a speed of common exogenous technological progress that is independent of any country-specific characteristics. Accordingly, we decide to show the empirical 10 results with and without the constant term.
We estimate equation (5) using the method of non-linear least squares (NLLS).
In general, NLLS results are sensitive to a choice of initial vectors because the objective function we try to minimize is not necessarily a globally convex function. In order to mitigate the problem of local optima, we explored different sets of initial values to attain the stability of the estimated parameters. Our procedure is two-step and is described as follows. First, we use the estimated parameters reported in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) to estimate four different sets of parameters (Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4). Then the attained baseline parameters are used as the initial parameters for each model.
Data
A major challenge in our empirical implementation is to measure technology because technology is an intangible. There are three widely used approaches to measure technology (Keller 2004) : first, to measure R&D inputs; second, to measure outputs using patent data; and finally, to measure the effect of technology in terms of productivity. In our study, we follow Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) and take the third approach to quantify the level of technology as the level of productivity: we compute Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as a measure of productivity level, A it , by postulating a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function. In this formulation, a technology level can be computed by the formula: log A it = y it -α k it -(1 -α) l it , where y, k, and l, are the log of real GDP, the log of physical capital inputs, and the log of population, respectively. We follow Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) and assume that α 1/3.
Since we do not have data on the physical capital stock, we also follow Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) 's procedure to compute the initial capital stock taking the method elaborated by . The procedure is to calculate the initial capital stock by using a formula, n 1960 1960 , where I/Y is the average share of physical investment in GDP in the sampling periods, γ represents the average rate of growth of output per capita, n represents the average rate of population growth, and δ represents the depreciation rate of capital, which is set to 3%. After deriving the level of initial capital stock, we calculate the capital stock for each year using annual investment data. Data for GDP, investment, population, and openness were extracted from the Penn World Table version 6.1. 6 The estimated values of TFP growth by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) seem plausible: the high performing East Asian countries exhibit the highest TFP growth while some of the Sub-Saharan African countries including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Niger, the Central African Republic, and Zambia show the negative growth rates.
As for data for human capital, we follow Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) and employ the average years of schooling in the population above 25 years of age, which are obtained from Barro and Lee (2000) , an updated version of the Barro and Lee (1993) dataset.
Data on TC is taken from the OECD/DAC's International Development
Statistics.
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The data set is available for both disbursement and commitment data for 6 In particular, the variables, pop, rgdpl, ki, and openk, in PWT 6.1 are used in the present paper. 7 The data is available at <http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE%202A>. We exclude countries which became OECD members before 1975. Also, Eastern European countries and the former USSR countries are eliminated from the data set because the data quality is not satisfactory (Kimura and Todo, 2007) .
TC. In this paper, we confine our analysis to the disbursement data because it is supposed to reflect the actual amount given to the recipient countries. We construct five different measures of TC. The first measure (ta12) Finally, three openness variables are constructed by using the total amount of international trade, i.e., a sum of total imports and exports. The first variable, open, is defined as the ratio of total international trade which is divided by GDP averaged over 1960-1995. The second variable, open80, is the average ratio over in and before 1980.
8 The data is available at <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2006_inflows_en.xls>.
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The third variable, open90, is the average ratio in and before 1990. In order to conduct robustness tests, we also use alternative data sets such as an updated version of Sachs and Warner's (1995) Openness Index.
After compiling these variables, we constructed a cross-country data which is composed of 85 countries for the period of 1960-1995. See Appendix table for descriptive statistics of the variables.
Benchmark Results
In this section, we show the benchmark estimation results of equation (5).
The first specification includes only TC and excludes FDI and openness. The results reported in Table 1 show that the estimated coefficients on TC, i.e., b 4 in equation (2) are consistently positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that TC plays an important role in facilitating domestic technological progress and international technology transfers 9 . Also, we cannot reject a null hypothesis that b 3 =1, supporting the logistic model of international technological transfers.
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Next,, we include the three variables of our interest: TC, FDI, and openness.
The results are presented in Table 2 . Most of the openness variables are positive and statistically significant in 12 out of 14 specifications. On the other hand, effects of the 9 Here, the endogeneity bias could affect the coefficients, while in the estimations which include iniTC are less likely to be affected by this bias since we employ initially available value of TC for each country. Our estimation results show that the amounts of b 4 for iniTC, iniTC/GDP are positive significant. Therefore, we find out that qualitative results would remain the same. 10 We also include FDI variables in addition to TC variables. The coefficients on FDI variables are largely positive. While the statistical significance depends on the choice of an FDI variable, the coefficients are significant in nine out of 14 specifications. For all the results, see our earlier version of the paper.
14 TC variable become less clear: there are eight and 10 positive and significant cases out of 14 specifications in TC and FDI variables, respectively. Notably, the initial TC variable generates a positive and statistically significant effect.
Comparing the effects of TC, FDI, and openness
While our overall estimation results reveal that TC, FDI, and openness facilitate international technological transfers, it is not necessarily clear the relative magnitude of these three factors. In order to compare the relative effectiveness of these three factors, we calculate the casual impact of one standard deviation change of each variable on the capacity variable, Φ, by multiplying each estimated coefficient by standard deviation of each variable 11 , which is reported in the Appendix Table. We employ the estimated results of specifications (3.2), (3.5), (3.7), (3.9), (3.11), and (3.13)
of Table 2 . In most specifications, the effect of openness is the largest which is followed by TC. FDI inflows have a positive but the lowest impact on building capacity of recipient countries.
Testing the Catching-Up Condition
Since the estimated coefficient, b 3 , is uniformly above one, our results favor the logistic diffusion model of technology transfers. Hence, there is a possibility for countries to encounter technological divergence from the leader country. In order to identify such countries quantitatively, we use the necessary condition represented by equation (4). Using estimated coefficients, the equation (4) can be rewritten as the 11 As to this method, we follow Barro and Lee (2005) .
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following expression:
where we assume that the capacity of the leader nation depends only on its human capital. Alternatively, we can derive the catch-up condition incorporating the FDI effect of the leader nation:
where
The test results of the catching-up condition are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. In both cases, if we use specification (3.2) in Table 2 , our results identify six countries that do not comply with equation (4); Central African Republic, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nepal, and Togo. Alternatively, using specification (3.5) in Table 2 gives 10 technologically trapped countries: Bangladesh, the Central African Republic, Iran, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nepal, Pakistan, Togo, and Democratic Republic of Congo. In contrast, 68 out of 85 countries always satisfy the catch-up condition (Tables 3 and 4) .
The countries, which do not satisfy the catch-up condition of equations (6) and (7), would not converge to the leader's technological progress. In such countries, we can employ equation (7) with the estimated parameters of equation (5) 
Robustness Tests
Relaxing the Function Form of Capacity Function 14
The second robustness check is to relax further the function form of the capacity function, Φ, in equation (3) and (4). Particularly, we are interested in interplay between TC and human capital. In this aim, we add an interaction term of TC with the human capital variable. The resulting empirical model becomes: TC, TC*h, FDI, Open] and β is its coefficient vector.
In Tables 5, we show estimation results of a wide variety of specifications with 13 These results are based on the results of specification (3.2) and (3.5), respectively, of Table 3. 14 We also perform four sets of robustness tests of the benchmark results to examine regional specificity. In order to check it, we construct an East Asia and Pacific dummy variable (hereafter, Asian dummy) which takes one if a country is categorized within the World Bank's East Asia and Pacific region and zero otherwise. The Asian dummy variable is incorporated independently into the Φ function. We also include the interaction variable of TC, FDI, and openness with the Asian dummy variable. According to our estimation results reported in Sawada, Matsuda, and Kimura (2007) , only the Asian dummy incorporated independently takes a statistically significant coefficient. The direction of the coefficient is positive, suggesting that Asian countries have systematically higher capacity to catch-up with the technology leader nation. various interaction terms. As for the level coefficients on TC, FDI, and openness variables, they are consistently positive and largely significant. Yet, as for the interaction terms, the estimated coefficients of TC and human capital interaction terms are mostly negative and statistically significant, suggesting that when a country's human capital level is low, the total technology transfer facilitation effect of TC becomes larger (Tables 5) 16 We also estimate coefficients of FDI and human capital interaction variables. See the full version of this paper for the results (Sawada, Matsuda, and Kimura, 2007) . The magnitude of these coefficients is generally small and their direction seems to be inconclusive, while these coefficients are mostly negative. As to the interaction term of openness and human capital variable, the coefficients are largely negative and significant This finding suggests that even when a country's human capital level is low, external openness will significantly facilitate international technological diffusion. Another possible hypothesis is that the TC, FDI and external trade openness might not affect the recipient's capacity to innovate its own technology (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) . However, we find that the specifications which reflect this hypothesis produce nonnegligible omitted variable biases. In addition, note that our theoretical framework imposes the constraint that relative degrees of contribution of the three channels are the same between the capacities to innovate own technology and to absorb foreign technologies. Since relaxing this constraint makes our estimations hard to converge, we find out that our equation of (5) is appropriate.
(IDIS) data. As we can see from Tables 6, qualitative results are the same as before.
We also employ two alternative indicators of openness: the ratio of imports to GDP, based on the World Bank's World Development Indicator, and the Sachs-Warner Index of Openness (Sachs and Warner 1995) . The latter variable takes zero (closed) if a country satisfies one of the following five criteria: (1) its average tariff rate exceeded 40%; (2) its non-tariff barriers covered more than 40% of imports; (3) it had a socialist economic system; (4) it had a state monopoly of major exports; or (5) its black-market premium exceeded 20% during either 1970s or 1980s. Results based on import data are summarize in Tables 7. Tables 8 show the results using Sachs and Warner (1995) Openness Index. Qualitative results are comparable to those based on the benchmark results.
Missing observations
Since the human capital data for the year 1960 is available only for 85 countries, we confine our analysis to this sample size. This implies that we did not necessarily utilize other available information to the full extent. In order to increase the number of countries in our analysis, we employ modified zero-order regression (Greene 2003, page.60) . In this method, we fill the missing variable with zeros and add a dummy variable that takes the value one for missing observations and zero for complete ones.
In fact, introduction of missing dummies for initial human capital variable, 
Concluding Remarks
In Assistance (180) Coefficients of missing dummies for TCs are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
***, **, * signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
In Model 3 and 4, we impose the restriction of s=1.
iniTC and iniGDP denotes for the amount of TC the earliest year available and GDP of the corresponding year.
bustness tests of all 4 models are conducted for allvariations of TC.
nce the specifications of Model 2 and 4 exclude a constant term, a conventional R2 is not computed (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) (3-4) (3-5) (3-6) (3-7) (3-8) (3-9) (3-10) (3-11) (3-12) (3-13) (3-14)
Model Coefficients of missing dummies for TC and FDI are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
In Model 3 and 4, we impose the restriction of s=1. Robustness tests of all 4 models are conducted for all variations of TC and FDI. Since the specifications of Model 2 and 4 exclude a constant term, a conventional R2 is not computed ♦ denotes that the standard error is not computed. (The case where the capacity of the leader nation depends on its human capital only) Name of specification (3-2) (3-5) (3-7) (3-9) (3-11) (3-13) Name of specification (3-2) (3-5) (3-7) (3-9) (3-11) (3-13) (The case where the capacity of the leader nation depends on its human capital, FDI and openness) Name of specification (3-2) (3-5) (3-7) (3-9) (3-11) (3-13) Coefficients of missing dummies for TC and FDI are not shown. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
In Model 3 and 4, we impose the restriction of s=1. Robustness tests of all 4 models are conducted for all variations of TC and FDI. Since the specifications of Model 2 and 4 exclude a constant term, a conventional R2 is not computed 
